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Abstract
We derive Nash-s-stationary equilibria for a class of quadratic multi-leader-follower games
using the nonsmooth best response function. To overcome the challenge of nonsmoothness, we
pursue a smoothing approach resulting in a reformulation as smooth Nash equilbrium problem.
We prove existence and uniqueness for all smoothing parameters. For a decreasing sequence of
these smoothing parameters accumulation points of Nash equilibria exist and we show that they
fullfill the conditions of s-stationarity. Finally, we propose an update on the leader variables for
efficient computation and numerically compare nonsmooth Newton and subgradient method.
Keywords: Multi-Leader-Follower Games, Nash Equilibria, Game Theory, Equilibrium Prob-
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1 Introduction and Background
The multi-leader-follower game (MLFG) is a particular class of problems in classical game theory
as a generalization to Stackelberg games which include a single leader. These models serve as an
analytical tool to study strategic behavior of individuals in a noncooperative manner. In particular,
the individuals (so-called players) are divided into two groups, namely leaders and followers, ac-
cording to their position in the game. Mathematically, this yields a hierarchical Nash game, where
further minimization problems appear in the participants’ optimization problems as constraints.
An equilibrium is then given by a multistrategy vector of all players, where no player has the
incentive to change his chosen strategy unilaterally.
Most recently, such type of models gained an increasing interest among mathematicians as well
as scientists in other fields such as operations research, robotics, and computer science [3, 25, 15].
However, compared to the knowledge of other classical game models so far little is known concerning
existence and uniqueness theory as well as suitable numerical solution methods.
The structure of MLFG can be seen as equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints
(EPEC), as the optimization problems of the followers might be replaced by the corresponding
optimality conditions. Recently, the competition on electric power market is described by EPEC
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[1, 4, 5, 14, 16]. Here, the leaders are power generators and consumers, who bid their cost and
utility functions. The single follower plays the role of an independent system operator coordinating
dispatch and minimizing social costs subject to network constraints.
So far, there exist only a few recent theoretical results for MLFG or EPEC, analyzing the
existence, the uniqueness and characterizations of equilibria: Pang and Fukushima [19] present a
reformulation as generalized Nash equilibrium problem and quasi-variational inequality. In another
work, Hu and Ralph [14] formulate a sufficient condition for the existence of pure strategy Nash
equilibria in a particular case of a MLFG related to an electricity market model. Leyffer and
Munson [16] describe various reformulations in terms of MPEC, nonlinear programs, and nonlinear
complementarity problems. Further discussions on MLFG and EPEC can be found in [2, 7, 12,
22, 24]. More recent work has been done by Hu and Fukushima in [13]. Therein, they discuss
the existence of robust Nash equilibria of a class of quadratic MLFG. Further, they propose a
uniqueness result for a MLFG with two leaders.
In this paper we study a quadratic MLFG with similarities to the model studied in [13] and
generalize the follower’s strategy set by allowing inequality constraints. This modification translates
into equilibrium conditions or to a nonsmooth Nash game formulation. With suitable convexity
assumptions, existence of Nash equilibria can be proved. Furthermore, we propose a smoothed
Nash game formulation and prove uniqueness of Nash equilibria for an arbitrary number of players.
Besides the theoretical results, we propose an algorithm to numerically compute Nash equilibria.
Therein, we combine an update based on a Taylor expansion of the parameter dependent solution
and the computation of Nash equilibria of approximating problems.
This article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the quadratic MLFG and give
two motivating examples. Then we develop an equivalent nonsmooth Nash equilibrium problem
(NEP) for which we can prove existence of equilibria and uniqueness. In Section 3, smoothing
of the best response of the follower leads to a differentiable NEP formulation. In Section 4, we
characterize the Nash equilibria of the smoothed problem by KKT conditions. For decreasing
smoothing parameter, the limit of the Nash equilibria fulfills a necessary optimality condition. In
Section 5, we introduce our general approach to compute Nash equilibria. In Section 6, we present
numerical results of the proposed methods.
2 Existence of Nash Equilibria of MLFG
We consider a MLFG, where the follower’s game is given by:
min
y∈Rm
Θ(y, x) =
1
2
y⊤Qyy − b(x)⊤y s.t. y ≥ l(x) (1)
where Qy ∈ R
m×m is a positive definite diagonal matrix and bi, li : Rn → R convex and differen-
tiable functions for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Furthermore, the leader problems are given for ν = 1, . . . , N by:
min
xν∈Rnν
θν(xν , x−ν) =
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν + a
⊤y s.t. xν ∈ Xν (2)
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with nonempty, convex, and closed strategy sets Xν which we assume to be described by smooth
functions gν : R
nν → Rmν such that Xν = {xν ∈ R
nν |gν(xν) ≤ 0}. The objective θν is strictly
convex quadratic with Qν ∈ R
nν×nν symmetric positive definite, cν ∈ Rnν , and a ∈ Rm+ . We denote
the multistrategy vector of all players by x = (xν)
N
ν=1 ∈ R
n and the opponent strategies to player
ν by x−ν = (xi)Ni=1,i 6=ν ∈ R
n−nν .
Remark 2.1. (Multiple Followers) For simplicity regarding notation, the model is introduced as
a Multi-Leader-(Single-)Follower game. However, this can be extended to multiple followers: For
j = 1, . . . , NF let:
min
yj∈Rmj
Θj(yj , x) =
1
2
y⊤j Q
j
yyj − bj(x)
⊤yj s.t. yj ≥ lj(x)
the j–th followers optimization problem with Qjy ∈ Rmj×mj a positive definite diagonal matrix and
bj , lj : R
n → Rmj convex in every component and differentiable. This structure is called potential
game and it can be equivalently reformulated as one optimization problem by summing the objectives
and concatenating the constraints, c.f. [17].
2.1 Motivating Examples
Harks et al. [11] modeled a routing game with parallel links, streets, connecting a common origin
to a common destination. The street owners aiming to maximize their revenue by tolls are modeled
as the set of leaders. In our notation, we write for each leader ν = 1, . . . , N :
max
xν∈R
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν s.t. gν(xν) = xν − t ≤ 0
where the Hessian in [11] is Qν = 2 for all ν and t ∈ R is a toll cap set by the authorities. In
[11], the toll cap is determined by an outer Stackelberg game. This maximization is different to
(1) could be modeled as cost minimization in a similar spirit. The commuters are modeled as a
unit flow with the goal to minimize linear latency cost plus toll cost. This translates to a single
quadratic follower problem of the commuters:
min
y∈RN
1
2
y⊤Qyy − b(x)⊤y s.t. y ≥ l(x) = 0,
N∑
i=1
yi = 1
where b(x) = −d − x and Qy = diag(2q1, . . . , 2qN ). The data d and q are given by the latency
functions of the commuters c(yi) = qiyi + di. This example shows that a diagonal positive definite
Qy is a reasonable assumption.
A second example is presented as electricity market model in [4, 5]. Here, the leader problems
represent profit maximization of electricity producers and are given for ν = 1, . . . , N :
min
xν∈R2
[
−yν
−y2ν
]⊤
xν + a
⊤
[
yν
y2ν
]
s.t. gν(xν) = −xν ≤ 0
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These leader problems are different to our model since its objective is linear. There is also a bilinear
term for a single leader and a follower variable, they do not allow for dependence on other leaders.
The follower problem represents an independent system operator aiming to minimize the total cost
and assigning the quantity required. Therefore the dimension of the follower variable is equal to
the number of leaders.
min
y∈RN
1
2
y⊤Qyy − b(x)⊤y s.t. y ≥ l(x) = 0,
N∑
i=1
yi ≥ D
where b and Qy are as in the toll model. The last constraints matches the demand D ∈ R+ to the
required electricity produced.
Although we cannot capture all features of the models in this paper, these examples shall
illustrate the importance of investigations on quadratic MLFG.
2.2 Theoretical Results
Since the follower’s problem has a strictly convex objective Θ(y, x) and a convex strategy set, we
state its unique solution in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2 (Follower’s Best Response). The follower’s optimization problem (1) has a unique
solution y∗ for any given leader strategy vector x ∈ Rn if in y∗ Guignard constraint qualification
holds. In particular, this best response function is:
y∗(x) = max
{
Q−1y b(x), l(x)
}
(3)
which is componentwise convex.
Proof. The objective and the feasible set are convex for any x ∈ Rn and we assume that Guignard
constraint qualification [10] holds in y∗. Therefore the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient
for a global minimizer. Since the objective is strictly convex the minimizer is unique for all leader
strategies x.
To derive the structure, we apply the KKT conditions: There exist Lagrange multipliers λ ∈ Rm
such that:
0 = Qyy − b(x)− λ
0 ≤ λ ⊥ y − l(x) ≥ 0
Combining these expressions yields: 0 ≤ λ = Qyy − b(x) ⊥ y − l(x) ≥ 0. We assumed Qy to be
positive definite and diagonal, therefore we can write equivalently: 0 ≤ y−Q−1y b(x) ⊥ y− l(x) ≥ 0
and 0 = min
{
y −Q−1y b(x), y − l(x)
}
, respectively. We obtain (3) by extracting y and changing
min to max. The components of best response function y∗(x) are convex in x as a maximum of
convex functions.
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We remark that the min and max operator are applied componentwise to a vector.
The MLFG is formulated as a Nash game by plugging the best response (3) in the leader game
(2) for ν = 1, . . . , N :
min
xν
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν +
m∑
i=1
aimax
{(
Q−1y b(x)
)
i
, li(x)
}
s.t. xν ∈ Xν (NEP)
Each optimization problem has a nonsmooth but convex objective and a convex strategy set. For
compact strategy sets, we can prove existence of Nash equilibria in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3 (Existence of Nash Equilibria for Compact Strategy Sets). Assume that the non-
smooth Nash equilibrium problem in (NEP) has a convex and compact joint strategy set X =
X1 × · · · ×XN , where all Xν are nonempty. Then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium.
Therefore also the quadratic multi-leader-follower game given by (1) and (2) has at least one
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We formulated the MLFG as a convex Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), especially the
objectives are continuous in (xν , x−ν) and convex in xν because they are a sum of a strictly convex
quadratic term and the maximum of two convex functions. Furthermore, we assumed the admissible
strategy sets Xν to be nonempty, convex, and compact. Therefore the conditions of [18, Theorem
3.1] are fulfilled.
In the following, we give an example of a MLFG where Nash equilibria can be explicitly com-
puted. This aims to illustrate that particularly the compactness assumption of the previous theorem
is a sufficient condition but not necessary.
In the remainder of this article, we assume b and l to be linear:
b(x) = B⊤x and l(x) = L⊤x
where B,L ∈ Rn×m, B:,i, L:,i ∈ Rn denotes the i-th column, and Bν,:, Lν,: denote their submatrices
of the rows referring to xν .
We consider the MLFG in (1-2) and assume strategy set to be the nonnegative orthant, i.e.
Xν = R
nν
+ . Since this strategy set is not compact, existence of Nash equilibria is not immediately
obvious. The resulting Nash equilibrium problem is written as follows for ν = 1, . . . , N :
min
xν
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν +
m∑
i=1
ai
(
max
{(
L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤
)
:,i
x, 0
}
+ (Q−1y B
⊤):,ix
)
s.t. xν ∈ R
nν
+
(4)
We are interested in the first derivative of the objective function in order to state optimality
conditions. Since we assume non-negativity of x, some parts of the sum are differentiable and
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others are not, depending on the entries of the matrix
(
L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤
)
. Therefore we split the sum
in the objective to emphasize accordingly:
I≥ =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
∣∣∣ (L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)
:,i
≥ 0
}
I< =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
∣∣∣0 6= (L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)
:,i
≤ 0
}
Ins = {1, . . . ,m} \ (I≥ ∪ I<)
These disjoint sets are independent of the decision variables and depend on the data only.
We separate the sum and drop max{·, ·} for the index sets I≥ and I<. This yields an equivalent
formulation because we assumed that for all i ∈ I≥ it holds
(
L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤
)
:,i
≥ 0 and together with
x ≥ 0 we conclude that the first argument of the max operator is always nonnegative. Similarly, it
holds
(
L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤
)
:,i
≤ 0 for all i ∈ I<. We write instead of (4) for ν = 1, . . . , N :
min
xν
θˆν(xν , x−ν) =
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν +
∑
i∈I≥
aiL
⊤
:,ix+
∑
i∈I<
ai(Q
−1
y B
⊤):,ix
+
∑
i∈Ins
aimax
{
(Q−1y B
⊤):,ix,L⊤:,ix
}
s.t. xν ∈ R
nν
+
(5)
With this reformulation, we can state a existence and uniqueness result for that non-compact
strategy set in case Ins = ∅ since nonsmooth parts of the objectives vanish.
Lemma 2.4 (Existence and Uniqueness). The Nash equilibrium problem (4) is reformulated as (5)
with the index sets I≥, I<, Ins. If Ins = ∅, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We assume Ins = ∅ then the objectives are differentiable. Due to [9, Proposition 1.4.2], a
strategy x ∈ Rn+ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x solves the variational inequality VI(R
n
+, θˆ
′)
with:
θˆ′(x) =


∇x1 θˆ1(x1, x−1)
...
∇xN θˆN (xN , x−N )

 .
Since we assume a convex and closed strategy set Rn+, the variational inequality has a unique
solution if θˆ′ is uniformly monotone [9, Theorem 2.3.3]. The remainder of the proof demonstrates
this. Let Q = diag(Q1, . . . , QN ), c = (c
⊤
1 , . . . , c
⊤
N )
⊤, and x, xˆ ∈ Rn+, then:
(x− xˆ)⊤
(
θˆ′(x)− θˆ′(xˆ)
)
= (x− xˆ)⊤
[
Qx+ c+
∑
i∈I≥
aiL
⊤
:,i +
∑
i∈I<
ai(Q
−1
y B
⊤):,i
−

Qxˆ+ c+ ∑
i∈I≥
aiL
⊤
:,i +
∑
i∈I<
ai(Q
−1
y B
⊤):,i

]
= (x− xˆ)⊤Q(x− xˆ) ≥ µ||x− xˆ||2
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where µ is the smallest eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix Q which is positive because Q is positive
definite. Thus θˆ′ is uniformly monotone. Therefore the variational inequality VI(Rn+, θˆ′) has exactly
one solution which is the unique Nash equilibrium of (5).
With this lemma we illustrate that compactness is not a necessary condition for existence. We
conclude this section by showing that the Nash equilibrium for diagonal Qν is computed explicitly.
Lemma 2.5. Assume that the Nash equilibrium problem in (4) is reformulated as in (5) with the
index sets I≥, I<, Ins. Furthermore, let Ins = ∅ and let Qν be diagonal. Then the Nash equilibrium
is given for ν = 1, . . . , N by:
xν = −min

Q−1ν cν + ∑
i∈I≥
aiQ
−1
ν L
⊤
ν,i +
∑
i∈I<
aiQ
−1
ν (Q
−1
y B
⊤)ν,i , 0


Proof. We consider the nonnegative orthant as strategy set, therefore Guignard constraint qualifi-
cation holds in every feasible point and we formulate the KKT system of the leader’s problems for
ν = 1, . . . , N :
0 = Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν +
∑
i∈I≥
aiL
⊤
ν,i +
∑
i∈I<
ai(Q
−1
y B
⊤)ν,i − λν and 0 ≤ λν ⊥ xν ≥ 0
⇔ 0 ≤ Q−1ν λν = xν + c
⊤
ν xν +
∑
i∈I≥
aiQ
−1
ν L
⊤
ν,i +
∑
i∈I<
aiQ
−1
ν (Q
−1
y B
⊤)ν,i ⊥ xν ≥ 0
⇔ 0 = xν +min

Q−1ν cν + ∑
i∈I≥
aiQ
−1
ν L
⊤
ν,i +
∑
i∈I<
aiQ
−1
ν (Q
−1
y B
⊤)ν,i, 0


The follower’s solution is obtained by plugging x in the best response (3).
2.3 Remarks on Extensions to the Model
In the following, we mention two generalizations to the follower problem in (1), which seem obvious
to include. We explain challenges to motivate future research.
In (1), it is assumed that the matrix Qy is positive definite and diagonal. A popular approach
in quadratic programming is to enforce diagonality of symmetric positive definite matrices by
introducing an auxiliary variable z = D⊤y where Qy = DD⊤ is the Cholesky decomposition, which
exists for symmetric positive definite Qy. The follower’s problem can be equivalently formulated
as a minimization problem in z:
min
z∈Rm
1
2
z⊤z − b(x)⊤D−⊤z s.t. z ≥ D⊤l(x)
As in Lemma 2.2, we derive the solution to this optimization problem explicitly:
z(x) = max{D−1b(x),D⊤l(x)}
and we recover the follower’s best response in this setting:
y(x) = D−⊤max{D−1b(x),D⊤l(x)}
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However, unlike (3), this function is not necessarily componentwise convex. But this property is
essential to guarantee convexity of the leaders’ objectives. This property is required for the proof
of existence of Nash equilibria in Theorem 2.3 as it is based on Kakutani fixed-point theorem.
An other obvious extension to the follower problem is to incorporate upper bounds besides the
discussed lower bounds, i.e. l(x) ≤ y ≤ u(x). We can also derive an explicit representation of
the best response, e.g. via projection of the objective’s gradient into the feasible set. For that let
y˜i(x) = (Qy)
−1
ii bi(x), then the best response is for i = 1, . . . ,m:
yi(x) = median(li(x), y˜i(x), ui(x)) =


y˜i(x) else
li(x) y˜i(x) ≤ li(x)
ui(x) y˜i(x) ≥ ui(x)
Like in the previous case, this best response is not necessarily convex, therefore the existence result
in Theorem 2.3 cannot be applied.
3 Existence of Nash Equilibria of Smoothed MLFG
We formulated the MLFG as a convex but nonsmooth Nash game and proved existence of equilibria
in case of compact strategy sets. In this section, we relax the nonsmoothness of the follower’s best
response. For the resulting smooth convex Nash equilibrium problem, we show existence and
uniqueness for more general strategy sets.
Similarly to Lemma 2.2, we formulate the follower’s KKT conditions:
0 ≤ y −Q−1y B
⊤x ⊥ y − L⊤x ≥ 0 (6)
where we replace the complementarity expression by a formulation with a nonlinear complemen-
tarity (NCP) function. We consider smooth NCP functions of the following type with smoothing
parameter ε > 0:
φε(α, β) = α+ β − φ˜ε(α− β). (7)
We remark that the smoothed minimum function is one example of this class, where φ˜ε
min
(α−β) =√
(α− β)2 + 4ε2. If we apply (7) on the KKT system (6), we obtain (component wise) for ε > 0:
0 = y −Q−1y B
⊤x+ y − L⊤x− φ˜ε
(
y −Q−1y B
⊤x− y + L⊤x
)
(8)
Therefore, we write the best response function as:
yε(x) =
1
2
[(
L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤
)
x+ φ˜ε
((
L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤
)
x
)]
(9)
The smoothed best response function yε in the leader’s objectives yields a smooth Nash equi-
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librium problem with positive smoothing parameter ε for ν = 1, . . . , N :
min
xν∈Rnν
θεν(xν , x−ν) =
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν
+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai
[(
L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤
)
x+ φ˜ε
((
L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤
)
x
)]
i
s.t. xν ∈ Xν
(NEP(ε))
For this game, we can state an existence and uniqueness theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence and Uniqueness). Assume that the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP(ε))
has a convex and closed strategy set X = X1 × · · · × XN , where all Xν are nonempty, and φ˜ε is
convex. Then the Nash equilibrium problem has a unique equilibrium for every smoothing parameter
ε > 0.
Proof. Due to [9, Proposition 1.4.2] and the convexity assumptions, a strategy x ∈ X is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if x solves the variational inequality VI(X, θ′ε), where:
θ′ε(x) =


∇x1θ
ε
1(x1, x−1)
...
∇xN θ
ε
N (xN , x−N )

 .
Since we assumed a convex and closed strategy set X, the variational inequality has a unique
solution if θ′ε is uniformly monotone [9, Theorem 2.3.3]. The remainder of the proof demonstrates
this.
We introduce a short hand for the linear term A = L⊤ − Q−1y B⊤, the block diagonal matrix
Q = diag(Q1, . . . , QN ), and the concatenation of c1, . . . , cN as c. Let x, xˆ ∈ X, then:
(x− xˆ)⊤
(
θ′ε(x)− θ′ε(xˆ)
)
=(x− xˆ)⊤
[
Qx+ c+
1
2
(L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤)⊤a+
1
2
m∑
i=1
aiA
⊤
i,:φ˜
′
ε((Ax)i)
−
(
Qxˆ+ c+
1
2
(L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤)⊤a+
1
2
m∑
i=1
aiA
⊤
i,:φ˜
′
ε((Axˆ)i)
)]
=(x− xˆ)⊤
[
Q(x− xˆ) +
1
2
m∑
i=1
aiA
⊤
i,:
(
φ˜′ε((Ax)i)− φ˜
′
ε((Axˆ)i)
)]
We apply the mean value theorem for φ˜′ε, then there exists a t ∈ [0, 1] such that we derive from the
last equation with ξi = t(Ax)i + (1− t)(Axˆ)i:
(x− xˆ)⊤
(
θ′ε(x)− θ′ε(xˆ)
)
=(x− xˆ)⊤Q(x− xˆ) +
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai φ˜
′′
ε(ξi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(x− xˆ)⊤A⊤i,:Ai,:(x− xˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥(x− xˆ)⊤Q(x− xˆ) ≥ µ||x− xˆ||2
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where µ is the smallest eigenvalue of Q. It is positive because Q is symmetric positive definite.
Thus θ′ε is uniformly monotone. Therefore the variational inequality VI(X, θˆε) has exactly one
solution which is the unique Nash equilibrium of the smoothed game (NEP(ε)).
An example for a smooth NCP function with convex φ˜ε is the minimum function φ
min
ε (α, β) =
α+ β −
√
(α− β)2 + 4ε2.
4 Characterization of Nash Equilibria
We recall the assumptions made for the smooth Nash equilibrium problem (NEP(ε)) for positive
smoothing parameter ε:
Assumption 4.1. We assume that the data of the MLFG and its smooth Nash game reformulation
satisfy for ν = 1, . . . , N :
• Qν ∈ R
nν×nν symmetric positive definite
• cν ∈ R
nν
• a ∈ Rm+
• Xν = {xν ∈ R
nν |gν(xν) ≤ 0} ⊆ R
nν nonempty, convex, and closed
• gν : R
nν → Rmν at least twice differentiable, and convex
• Qy ∈ R
m×m positive definite and diagonal
• B,L ∈ Rn×m
• smooth NCP function of the form φε(α, β) = α + β − φ˜ε(α − β) where φ˜ε is at least twice
differentiable and convex for every ε > 0
We state the KKT conditions of each optimization problem. For ν = 1, . . . N , the KKT condi-
tions of player ν’s optimization problem are:
0 =Qνxν + cν +
1
2
(L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤)⊤ν,:a
+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤ν,i φ˜ε
′ (
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)x]i
)
+∇xνgν(xν)λν
0 = min {λν ,−gν(xν)}
with Lagrange multiplier λν ∈ R
mν
+ and the Jacobian of the constraints∇xνgν(xν) = (∇xνgν1(xν), . . . ,∇xνgνmν (xν)) ∈
R
nν×mν .
Remark 4.2 (KKT Point is Equilibrium). We consider the smooth Nash equilibrium problem
(NEP(ε)) for ν = 1, . . . , N and the Assumptions 4.1. Then the KKT conditions are necessary and
sufficient for the global minimizer of each leader problem (NEP(ε)), because each leader problem
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has a strictly convex objective and a convex and closed strategy set. Therefore the joint KKT system
is necessary and sufficient for the unique Nash equilibrium. The follower’s solution can be explicitly
computed by the leader’s solutions, c.f. (9).
We summarize the KKT systems of all ν = 1, . . . , N as a single system using the notation
Q = diag(Q1, . . . , QN ) and c = (c
⊤
1 , . . . , c
⊤
N )
⊤.
0 =Qx+ c+
1
2
(L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤)⊤a
+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,i φ˜ε
′ (
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)x]i
)
+


∇x1g1(x1)λ1
...
∇xNgN (xN )λN

 (11a)
0 =min




λ1
...
λN

 ,


−g1(x1)
...
−gN (xN )



 (11b)
This system characterizes the Nash equilibrium for a fixed relaxation parameter ε. In the following,
we analyze the limit ε→ 0.
4.1 Limit System
Theorem 3.1 states an existence and uniqueness result for Nash equilibrium of the relaxed NEP(ε)
for every ε > 0. Therefore, we know that there exists a map ε 7→ x∗(ε). If we assume that it holds
LICQ in x∗ν(ε) for ν = 1, . . . , N , the uniqueness of the Lagrange multipliers implies that there is
also a map ε 7→ λ∗(ε).
In order to emphasize the dependence of (x∗, λ∗) on the parameter ε, we state (11) as:
0 =Qx(ε) + c+
1
2
(L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤)⊤a
+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,i φ˜ε
′ (
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)x(ε)]i
)
+


∇x1g1(x1(ε))λ1(ε)
...
∇xNgN (xN (ε))λN (ε)


0 =min




λ1(ε)
...
λN (ε)

 ,


−g1(x1(ε))
...
−gN (xN (ε))




(12)
We are interested in the solution of the system in the limit ε → 0. One can show the following
Lemma with elementary arguments on convergence of sequences in compact spaces.
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Lemma 4.3. Let x∗(ε) ∈ X ⊂ Rn and λ∗(ε) ∈ Λ ⊂ Rm¯ for all ε > 0 where (x∗(ε), λ∗(ε)) solves
(12) for a ε > 0. Assume that X and Λ are nonempty, closed, and bounded.
Then the sequence of KKT solutions (x∗(εk), λ∗(εk))k∈N for a sequence εk → 0 has convergent
subsequence (x∗(εk), λ∗(εk))k∈K , i.e. (x∗(εk), λ∗(εk))→ (x∗(0), λ∗(0)) for k ∈ K and k →∞.
We note, that compactness of Λ follows from the existence of an accumulation point x∗(0) and
from the assumption of LICQ, the proof is analogous to [23, Theorem 5.2].
Next, we analyze the limit system for a limit Nash equilibrium (x∗(0), λ∗(0)). The critical part
of (12) is φ˜ε which is nonsmooth for ε = 0. In the remainder of this section, we consider the
smoothed minimum function:
φ˜ε(z) = φ˜ε
min
(z) =
√
z2 + 4ε2.
We note that the argument of φ˜0 also depends on the smoothing parameter ε.
lim
ε→0
φ˜ε
′ (
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)x(ε)]i
)
=

1, [(L
⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x(ε)]i > 0 ∀ε > 0
−1, [(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x(ε)]i < 0 ∀ε > 0
The derivative of φ˜ε is not defined if the argument is zero for ε = 0, however the Clarke subdiffer-
ential exists:
∂C φ˜0(z) = ∂
C |z| =


1, z > 0
−1, z < 0
[−1, 1], z = 0
In the following, we state necessary optimality conditions which are weaker than KKT but
require locally Lipschitz continuity only. Subdifferentials are available for convex local Lipschitz
functions.
Definition 4.4 (Slater Condition). A set X = {x ∈ Rn|gi(x) ≤ 0, gi convex , i = 1, . . . ,m} fulfills
the Slater condition if and only if there exists a xˆ ∈ X such that gi(xˆ) < 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m. (xˆ is
called a strictly feasible point.)
Theorem 4.5 (Fritz-John conditions of Clarke for nonsmooth objectives). Let f : Rn → R be
locally Lipschitz-continuous and g : Rn → Rm differentiable. Let x¯ ∈ Rn be a local minimizer of f
on X = {x ∈ Rn|g(x) ≤ 0}.
Then there exists multipliers α¯ ≥ 0 and λ¯ ∈ Rm+ such that (α¯, λ¯) 6= 0, λ
⊤g(x∗) = 0, and:
0 ∈ α¯∂Cf(x¯) +
m∑
i=1
λ¯i∇gi(x¯).
In case Slater condition holds, it is guaranteed that α¯ 6= 0.
Proof. In [8, Theorem 6.1.1] a more general setting is proved. If the Slater condition holds, α¯ 6= 0
[8, Proposition 6.3.1].
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If Slater condition holds, we can assume w.l.o.g. that α¯ = 1. With Theorem 4.5, we state
necessary optimality conditions of the nonsmooth Nash equilibrium problem formulation (NEP).
Let x¯ be a vector of local minimizer x¯ν of each leader problem and Slater condition holds for every
strategy set Xν , then there exists for ν = 1, . . . , N a multiplier λν ∈ R
mν
+ such that:
0 ∈ Qν x¯ν + cν +
1
2
(L⊤ +Q−1y B
⊤)⊤ν,:a
+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤ν,i ∂
C φ˜0
(
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)x¯]i
)
+∇xνgν(x¯ν)λν
(13a)
0 =min {λν ,−gν(x¯ν)} (13b)
Due to convexity of the objective, it is regular and its smooth parts are differentiated in the classical
sense and only the nonsmooth part is differentiated in the Clarke sense.
In case [(L⊤−Q−1y B⊤)x∗(0)]i = 0 does not appear for any i, the necessary optimality conditions
of Fritz-John type in (13) coincide with the classical KKT conditions which necessary and sufficient
in our setting, thus x¯ = x∗(0). The more interesting case is if there is at least one i with [(L⊤ −
Q−1y B⊤)x∗(0)]i = 0. Here, we define the limit Φ = lim
ε→0
φ˜ε
′ (
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x(ε)]i
)
. It is clear that
Φ ∈ [−1, 1] because
∣∣∣φ˜ε′(z)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ z√z2+4ε2 ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ z√z ∣∣∣ = 1 for any z 6= 0 and φ˜ε′(0) = 0. Therefore,
Θ ∈ ∂C φ˜0
(
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x(0)]i
)
and we conclude that x∗(0) satisfies the necessary optimality
conditions in (13).
Instead of looking at optimality conditions for the nonsmooth formulation, we are considering
stationarity concepts for mathematical programs with complementarity constraints (MPCC) next.
For that, we adapt [21, Theorem 2]:
Definition 4.6 (S-Stationarity). Let f : Rn → R, g : Rn → Rm, and G1, G2 : R
n → Rl be
smooth functions. Then we call:
min
z
f(z)
s.t. g(z) ≤ 0
0 = min {G1(z), G2(z)}
(MPCC)
a mathematical program with complementarity constraints. Furthermore, we call z¯ a strongly (s-
)stationary point of (MPCC) if there exist multipliers (λ,Γ1,Γ2) ∈ R
m+l+l with:
0 = ∇zf(z¯) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇zgi(z¯)−
l∑
i=1
Γ1,i∇zG1,i(z¯)−
l∑
i=1
Γ2,i∇zG2,i(z¯)
g(z¯) ≤ 0
λ ≥ 0
gi(z¯)λi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m
G1,i(z¯)Γ1,i = 0, i = 1, . . . , l
G2,i(z¯)Γ2,i = 0, i = 1, . . . , l
Γ1,i,Γ2,i ≥ 0, i : G1,i(z¯) = G2,i(z¯) = 0
(14)
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Each leader problem can be formulated as a MPCC, which form together the generalized Nash
equilibrium problem (GNEP) formulation of the MLFG. In the following theorem we verify that
x∗ν(0) is a s-stationary point for every leader ν = 1, . . . , N .
Theorem 4.7. Under the given assumptions the Nash equilibrium x∗ν(0) is a strongly stationary
point for each leader ν = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. We begin with the MPCC formulation of each leader problem for ν = 1, . . . , N , we have:
min
xν ,y
θν(xν , x−ν) =
1
2
x⊤ν Qνxν + c
⊤
ν xν + a
⊤y
s.t. gν(xν) ≤ 0
0 = min{G1(xν , x−ν , y), G2(xν , x−ν , y)}
with G1(xν , x−ν , y) = y − (Q−1y B⊤)⊤x and G2(xν , x−ν , y) = y − L⊤x.
Before verifying the statement, we apply the s-stationarity conditions of (14):
0 =
(
Qνxν + cν
a
)
+
m∑
i=1
λi
(
∇xνgν,i(xν)
0
)
−
l∑
i=1
Γ1,i
(
−(Q−1y B⊤)ν,i
ei
)
−
l∑
i=1
Γ2,i
(
−Lν,i
ei
)
(15a)
gν(xν) ≤ 0 (15b)
λν ≥ 0 (15c)
gν,i(xν)λν,i = 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν (15d)
(y − (Q−1y B
⊤)⊤x)iΓ1,i = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m (15e)
(y − L⊤x)iΓ2,i = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m (15f)
Γ1,i,Γ2,i ≥ 0, i : (y − (Q
−1
y B
⊤)⊤x)i = (y − L⊤x)i = 0 (15g)
We derive the conditions of s-stationarity (15) from (13) which can be equivalently expressed
that there exists c ∈ [0, 1]m such that:
0 =Qνxν + cν +
m∑
i=1
ai
(
ci(Q
−1
y B
⊤)ν,i + (1− ci)Lν,i
)
+∇xνgν(x¯ν)λν (16a)
0 =min {λν ,−gν(x¯ν)} (16b)
Where we remark, that ci is unique only if (L
⊤x)i 6= ((Q−1y B⊤)x)i because the NCP function ap-
proximates the absolute value such that
∣∣[(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x]i∣∣ = (L⊤−Q−1y B⊤)⊤ν,i ∂C φ˜0 ([(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x]i).
We choose Γ1,i = aici and Γ2,i = ai(1 − ci), with that choice Γ1,i,Γ2,i ≥ 0 for all i because
ai > 0, therefore (15g) holds. The equation (16a) yields the upper part of (15a), the lower part is
obtained with the choice of the multipliers, since ai − Γ1,i − Γ2,i = ai − aici − ai(1− ci) = 0 for all
i. Furthermore, second expression (16b) is equivalent to (15b-15d).
It remains to demonstrate (15e-15f):
(i) Assume G1,i(xν , x−ν) ≥ 0, then ci = 0 because of the Clarke derivative in (13a) and this
yields Γ1,i = 0. Therefore Γ2,i = ai > 0 and G2,i(xν , x−ν) = 0, which is consistent to the feasibility.
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(ii) Assume G1,i(xν , x−ν) = G2,i(xν , x−ν) = 0, then Γ1,i,Γ2,i are arbitrary.
(iii) Assume G1,i(xν , x−ν) = 0 and G2,i(xν , x−ν) ≥ 0, then ci = 1 similar to (i) and this yields
Γ2,i = 0. Therefore Γ1,i = ai > 0, which is consistent to the feasibility.
Since this holds for all i = 1, . . . ,m, (i)-(iii) yield (15e-15f) and the proof is complete.
5 Numerical Algorithms
In the previous section, we reformulated the MLFG in (1,2) as smooth Nash game (NEP(ε)) with a
smoothing parameter ε > 0. We apply a gradient type method and recall corresponding convergence
theory. As alternative we propose a Newton like method.
5.1 The Method
For a fixed smoothing parameter ε, the KKT system in (11) characterizes the unique Nash equi-
librium of (NEP(ε)), therefore, we aim to find a primal dual pair (x, λ) which satisfies the KKT
conditions. Let F ε1 (x, λ) = F
ε
1 (z) = 0 be a short hand of (11a) and F
ε
2 (x, λ) = F
ε
2 (z) = 0 of (11b),
respectively. We abbreviate the concatenation with F ε(z).
With this notation, the KKT system can be equivalently expressed as the minimization of the
auxiliary function Ψε : R
n+m¯ → R+ where m¯ = m1 + · · ·+mN and:
Ψε(z) =
1
2
||F ε(z)||22 =
1
2
(
||F ε1 (z)||
2
2 + ||F
ε
2 (z)||
2
2
)
The global minimum is obtained for an z∗ satisfying Ψε(z∗) = 0. For convergence theory, the
Lipschitz property of Ψε is crucial, therefore we prove it in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Ψε is locally Lipschitz and directionally differentiable.
Proof. We verify the properties for each part of the sum separately.
(i) 12 ||F1(z)||
2
2 ∈ C
1, as a composition of C1 functions because φε is assumed to be twice differen-
tiable. Therefore this part is locally Lipschitz and directionally differentiable.
(ii) 12 ||F2(z)||
2
2 =
1
2
m∑
i=1
min2{λi,−gi(x)} =
1
8
m∑
i=1
(λi − gi(x)− |λi + gi(x)|)
2 is locally Lipschitz as
a composition of locally Lipschitz functions. It is also directionally differentiable as it is also a
composition of directionally differentiable functions.
We are interested in the solution of the system for ε close to zero. However, the problem
characteristics are poor for very small ε and we expect bad numerical performance with arbitrary
initial values. Therefore, we propose to solve a sequence of minimization problems:
min Ψε(z) s.t. z ∈ R
n+m¯
with decreasing sequence of (εi)i∈N. This approach returns a sequence of KKT points (z∗(εi))i∈N =
(x∗(εi), λ∗(εi))i∈N whose primal part (x
∗(εi))i∈N is the Nash equilibrium of NEP(εi). We use the
solution z∗(εi) as initial value for the subsequent solving for εi+1.
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To further increase the quality of the initial values, we propose an update for the primal variables
x based on formal Taylor expansion of the map ε 7→ x∗(ε). We compute the derivative of the
objectives of the Nash game with respect to ε which implicitly characterize ∂x
∂ε
7. For ν = 1, . . . , N :
d
dε
(∇xνθ
ε
ν(xν(ε), x−ν(ε))) = 0
which leads to the following system:
E
∂x
∂ε
(ε) = h
Here, we denote φ˜ε(t) = Φ(t, ε) to emphasize the explicit dependence on ε, then the linear system
has the following coefficient matrix:
E = Q+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,i(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤):,i
∂2Φ
∂t2
((L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,ix, ε)
and the right-hand-side:
h =
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,i
∂Φ
∂ε
((L⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,ix, ε)
We remark that E is nonsingular since it is the second derivative of the strictly convex objectives.
We summarize the general approach in the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1
1: Initialize Choose z0(ε0) = (x
0(ε0), λ
0(ε0)) ∈ R
n+m¯, tol > 0, ε0 ∈ (1, 2), γ ∈ (0, 1)
2: for i = 0, 1, . . . do
3: Compute Nash equilibrium of (NEP(εi)) with initial guess z
0(εi) = (x
0(εi), λ
0(εi)) by
z∗(εi) = (x∗(εi), λ∗(εi)) = arg min
z∈Rn+m¯
Ψεi(z)
4: Decrease εi+1 = γεi
5: Compute Taylor update
di =
∂x
∂ε
(εi+1)
6: Update initial guess x0(εi+1) = x
∗(εi)− (εi − εi+1)di and λ0(εi+1) = λ∗(εi)
7: end for
In Step 5 of the algorithm, we use a forward evaluation of ∂x
∂ε
but also ∂x
∂ε
(εi) is a valid choice.
In the remainder of this section, we propose two algorithms for computation of the Nash equilibria
in Step 3, but other approaches are conceivable.
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5.2 Subgradient Method
To generate the sequence of Nash equilibria, we propose a method which is based on subgradient
decent. We apply the method of [6] for a fixed relaxation parameter ε > 0. Stationary points of Ψε
are computed as the limit of a sequence of h-δ-stationary points. Bagirov et. al. [6] showed that
the limit is a Clarke stationary point. With this method we obtain the unique Nash Equilibrium
of the smoothed game.
Before stating the algorithm and the inherent convergence results, we introduce some terms:
Definition 5.2 (h-δ stationary point). Let Wh(x) denote the closed convex hull of all possible
quasisecants of a locally Lipschitz function f : Rn → R at the point x ∈ Rn with length h > 0:
Wh(x) = conv {w ∈ R
n : ∃d ∈ Rn with ||d|| = 1 : w = v(x, d, h)}
Then a point x is called a h-δ stationary point of a locally Lipschitz function f : Rn → R if and
only if:
min {||v|| : v ∈Wh(x)} < δ.
Lemma 5.3. (1) If max{||v|| : v ∈ Wh(z)} < ∞ for all iterates z
k ∈ Rn+m¯, the loop in Lines
7-15 terminates after finitely many iterations with a decent direction. (2) The loop in Lines 4-20
terminates after finitely many iterations with a h-δ-stationary point.
Proof. (1) Since Ψε is locally Lipschitz with Lemma 5.1, [6, Proposition 4.1] is applicable.
(2) The function Ψε is bounded from below as it takes nonnegative values only, therefore [6,
Proposition 5.1] is applicable.
Theorem 5.4. Assume L(z0) =
{
z ∈ Rn+m¯ : Ψε(z) ≤ Ψε(z
0)
}
is bounded and Assumption A.2 is
fulfilled. Then there exists at least one accumulation point of the sequence (zk)k∈N generated by
Alg. 2 and any accumulation point is a stationary point of Ψε.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5.1, Ψε is locally Lipschitz and therefore [6, Proposition 5.2] is applicable.
The boundedness of L(z0) implies that it exists at least one accumulation point.
Bagirov et. al. [6] state that subgradients are in particular quasisecants and therefore we limit
ourselves to the usage of subgradients as decent directions and to h = 0 in the implementations.
The algorithm is stated as Algorithm 2 below.
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Algorithm 2 Subgradient Method
1: Initialize h0 > 0 , δ0 > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1), z
0 ∈ Rn+m¯, d0 ∈ R
n+m¯ with ||d0|| = 1, 0 < c2 ≤ c1 ≤ 1,
ε > 0
2: for k = 0, . . . do
3: z¯1 = z
k
4: for j = 1, . . . do ⊲ compute h-δ-stationary point
5: Compute quasisecant v0 = v(z¯j , d0, h)
6: v˜0 = v0
7: for i = 0, 1, . . . do ⊲ find decent direction
8: ci = argmin{||cvi + (1− c)v˜i||
2
2 |c ∈ (0, 1)}
9: v¯i = civi + (1− ci)v˜i
10: if ||v¯i|| ≤ δk then return v
j = v¯i
11: di = −
v¯i
||v¯i||
12: if Ψε(z¯j + hdi)−Ψε(z¯j) ≤ −c1h||v¯i|| then return v
j = v¯i
13: Compute quasisecant vi+1 = v(x, di, h)
14: v˜i+1 = v¯i
15: end for
16: if ||vj || ≤ δk then Stop
17: dj = − v
j
||vj ||
18: Compute step length such that
σj = argmax{Ψε(z¯j + σd
j)−Ψε(z¯j) ≤ −c2σ||v
j || |σ > 0}
19: Update z¯j+1 = z¯j + σjd
j
20: end for
21: zk+1 = z¯j
22: hk+1 = γhk
23: δk+1 = γδk
24: end for
5.3 Nonsmooth Newton Method
Next, we present an improved method. The joint KKT system (11) leads to the problem to find
the unique z∗(ε) = (x∗(ε), λ∗(ε)) that satisfy:
F ε(z) = 0
This is a nonlinear and nonsmooth system of equations which depend on the parameter ε > 0.
The generalized Newton method can be written as the solving of a sequence of the following linear
systems:
H
(
zk+1 − zk
)
= −F ε(zk)
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for an element H ∈ ∂F ε(zk) of the Clarke subdifferential of F ε. The explicit structure of a
generalized Jacobian H can be found in A.2.
SinceH is not necessarily regular, we verify this property in Step 5 of Algorithm 3 and use a first
order decent direction if necessary. This subgradient decent also serves as globalization strategy.
Algorithm 3 Nonsmooth Newton Method
1: Initialize Choose z0 = (x0, λ0) ∈ Rn+m¯, β ∈ (0, 1), σ ∈ (0, 0.5), tol > 0, ε > 0
2: for k = 0, . . . do
3: if Ψε ≤ tol then Stop
4: Let H ∈ ∂F ε(zk)
5: if H singular then do subgradient decent of Ψε, thus
sk ∈ −∂Ψε(z
k)
with the step length tk = max{β
l|l = 0, 1, . . . } which fulfills the Armijo condition
Ψε(z
k + tksk) ≤ Ψε(z
k) + tkσsk
⊤
sk
6: else let tk = 1 and compute Newton step by solving
Hsk = −F ε(zk)
7: Update zk+1 = zk + tks
k
8: end for
For further discussions and convergence analysis we refer to e.g. [20].
6 Numerical Results
In the previous sections, we proposed an algorithm with gradient updates of the primal variables.
This included the computation of Nash equilibria for a sequence of smoothing parameter (εi)i∈N.
For this computation, we introduced a subgradient and a Newton method. The presented numerical
results are obtained for the data sets in A.3 which are adapted from [13]. All plots are generated
for the Data Set 1, however experiments with Data Set 2 produced similar graphics.
The naive approach of computing a sequence of Nash equilibria is to use the Nash equilibrium of
a larger smoothing parameter as initial for the subsequent computation with the smaller smoothing
parameter. The main purpose of the outer Taylor expansion based update in Algorithm 1 (Step 5
and 6) is to improve the quality of the initials in order to reduce the computational effort in Step
3.
In the upper left part of Figure 6, we observe the quadratic decent of the error for decreasing
smoothing parameter. In the upper right part, the Taylor update is exemplary illustrated for one
component of the leader variables. The blue dots indicate each the Nash equilibrium of a (NEP(εi)),
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Figure 1: Upper left: Quadratic convergence to the limit Nash equilibrium x∗(0), right: Taylor
expansion based update on primal variables, exemplary for first leader variable; Lower: comparison
of Subgradient and Nonsmooth Newton method for varying smoothing parameter.
x∗(εi). A black line represents the Taylor update and the lower end of a black line indicates the
updated initial values x0(εi+1) for the subsequent Nash equilibrium computation.
The lower part of Figure 6 is dedicated to illustrate the importance of large smoothing parameter
for the first computations of Nash equilibria. Since the problem gets closer to it original nonsmooth
formulation as ε decreases, the problem is also more challenging to solve for both Subgradient and
Nonsmooth Newton method. We observe this expected behavior, in particular if we compare the
number of iterations for ε = 1.6 and ε = 0.1.
As already seen in Figure 6, the subgradient based method suffers from characteristically slow
convergence for our instances. In Figure 6 on the left, all iterations for a sequence of decreasing
smoothing parameter are shown. On the right, we observe the performance for a single fixed ε but
using multiple random initial values.
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Figure 2: Subgradient Method; left all iterations for decreasing sequence of smoothing parameters,
right for one smoothing parameter and multiple initials.
Similarly to Figure 6, left in Figure 6, all iterations for a sequence of decreasing smoothing
parameter are shown for the Nonsmooth Newton. The alternating behavior is due to the decreasing
parameter changing the minimization problem. The right part of Figure 6 illustrates the decrease
in Ψε for different random initial values but fixed smoothing parameter.
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Figure 3: Nonsmooth Newton Method; left all iterations for decreasing sequence of smoothing
parameters, right for one smoothing parameter and multiple initials.
7 Conclusion
We presented a quadratic MLFG and explicitly computed the best response of the follower player.
With this best response we derived a Nash game formulation where existence theory is available.
Furthermore, we smoothed the best response function and formulate the MLFG as smooth Nash
game and proved existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for all smoothing parameters.
We followed an all KKT approach to characterize the corresponding Nash equilibrium. For decreas-
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ing positive smoothing parameter, we showed that the limit of Nash equilibria satisfies conditions
of s-stationarity. Numerically, we computed Nash equilibria with a globalized nonsmooth Newton
and compare with a standard methods based on subgradients. For efficient computation, we up-
dated the primal variables by a Taylor approximation before a subsequent computation of the Nash
equilibrium for a smaller smoothing parameter.
In Section 2.1, we stated examples that offer obvious additional requirements to the model
presented here. Also, the extension possibilities discussed in Section 2.3 are also subject of further
investigation.
A Appendix
A.1 Subgradient Method
In the following, we state the definition of quasisecants and a theorem which relates quasisecants
and subgradients. Furthermore, we state a assumption which is needed in the convergence theorem
of the subgradient method. All is adapted from [6] and can be found there in an extended form.
Definition A.1 (Quasisecant). A vector v = v(x, d, h) ∈ Rn is called a quasisecant of a locally
Lipschitz function f : Rn → R at the point x ∈ Rn in direction d ∈ Rn with ||d|| = 1 with the length
h > 0 if and only if:
f(x+ hd)− f(x) ≤ h〈v, d〉
and:
v ∈ ∂d,hf(x) +BO(h)
where ∂d,hf = ∪t∈[0,h]∂f(x + td) denotes the union of all Clarke subdifferentials over the set
conv(x, x+ hd) and BO(h) denotes a ball for which O(h)→ 0 for h→ 0.
For the convergence proof it is necessary to study the relation of Wh(x) (Definition 5.2) and
the subdifferential ∂f(x) and therefore the following assumption is crucial.
Assumption A.2. At any given point x ∈ Rn there exists δ = δ(x) > 0 such that O(y, h) ↓ 0
uniformly as h ↓ 0 for all y ∈ Bδ(x) that is for any η > 0 there exists h(η) > 0 such that
O(y, h) < η for all h ∈ (0, h(η)) and y ∈ Bδ(x).
In particular, this assumptions guarantees a certain relation between quasisecants and subgra-
dients.
Theorem A.3. Assume that a function f satisfies Assumption A.2. Then at a given point x ∈ Rn
for any η > 0 there exists δ = δ(η) and h(η) > 0 such that:
Wh(y) ⊂ ∂f +Bη
for all h ∈ (0, h(η)) and y ∈ Bδ(x). Furthermore, it holds for locally Lipschitz function that the
limit h→ 0 of the Wh(x) lies in the subdifferential, i.e.:
W0(x) ⊂ ∂f(x)
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A.2 Nonsmooth Newton
We propose a nonsmooth Newton method to compute Nash equilibria. In order to keep the read-
ability of the paper, we specify the structure of the generalized Jacobian here.
We look at the elements of ∂Fε as a block matrix:
H =
[
A B
C D
]
Where A ∈ Rn×n :
A = Q+


∇x(1)(∇x1g1(x1)λ1)
. . .
∇xN (∇xN gN (xN )λN )


+
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤)⊤:,i(L
⊤ −Q−1y B
⊤):,i
 1√
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x]2i + 4ε2
−
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x]2i√
[(L⊤ −Q−1y B⊤)x]2i + 4ε2
3


and B ∈ Rn×m¯ :
B =


∇x1g1(x1)
. . .
∇xN gN (xN )


and the block diagonal C ∈ Rm¯×n:
C =


C1
. . .
CN


with the blocks Cν ∈ R
mν×nν and the entries:
(
Cν
)
i,j
= ∂C
x
j
ν
min
{
λiν ,−g
i
ν(xν)
}
=


0, λiν < −g
i
ν(xν)
− ∂
∂x
j
ν
giν(xν), λ
i
ν > −g
i
ν(xν)[
0,− ∂
∂x
j
ν
giν(xν)
]
, λiν = −g
i
ν(xν)
and the diagonal matrix:
D =


D1
. . .
DN

 ∈ Rm¯×m¯
with its blocks Dν ∈ R
mν×mν with the entries:
(
Dν
)
i
= ∂Cλiν
min
{
λiν ,−g
i
ν(xν)
}
=


1, λiν < −g
i
ν(xν)
0, λiν > −g
i
ν(xν)
[1, 0] , λiν = −g
i
ν(xν)
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A.3 The Data
In the following, we specify the data used for the experiments presented in Section 5. We adapted
the data used in [13].
A.3.1 Data Set 1
We consider N = 2 leader with each n1 = n2 = 2 variables. The objectives of the leader are given
by
Q1 =
[
1.7 1.6
1.6 2.8
]
Q2 =
[
2.7 1.3
1.3 3.6
]
c1 = c2 =
[
0
0
]
a =

1.42.6
2.1


Each leader has m1 = m2 = 3 linear constraints gν = A
T
ν xν + bν ≤ 0 with
A1 =
[
1.6 0.8 1.3
2.6 2.2 1.7
]
b1 =

1.61.2
0.4

 A2 =
[
1.8 1.6 1.4
1.3 1.2 2.7
]
b2 =

1.61.5
2.6


The follower has M = 3 variables and its objective and constraints are given by
Qy =

2.5 0 00 3.6 0
0 0 4.6

 B =


2.3 1.4 2.6
1.3 2.1 1.7
2.5 1.9 1.4
1.3 2.4 1.6

 L =


1.3 2.4 1.8
1.3 2.4 1.8
1.3 2.4 1.8
1.3 2.4 1.8


A.3.2 Data Set 2
We consider N = 3 leader with each n1 = n2 = n3 = 2 variables. The objectives of the leader are
given by
Q1 =
[
2.5 1.6
1.6 3.8
]
Q2 =
[
2.9 1.3
1.3 1.8
]
Q3 =
[
3.2 2.3
2.3 2.6
]
c1 = c2 = c3 =
[
0
0
]
a =

0.41.6
2.6


Each leader has m1 = m2 = m3 = 3 linear constraints gν = A
T
ν xν + bν ≤ 0 with
A1 =
[
1.6 0.8 1.3
2.6 2.2 1.7
]
A2 =
[
1.8 1.6 1.4
1.3 1.2 2.7
]
A3 =
[
2.3 1.9 1.6
1.3 1.7 2.7
]
b1 =
[
1.6 1.2 0.4
]⊤
b2 =
[
1.6 1.5 2.6
]⊤
b3 =
[
1.5 0.3 1.8
]⊤
The follower has M = 3 variables and its objective and constraints are given by
Qy =

3.7 0 00 2.6 0
0 0 0.7

 B =


0.8 2.1 1.3
1.5 2.3 0.7
1.5 0.9 2.4
1.8 2.3 3.6
1.3 1.7 1.7
1.1 2.6 1.6


L =


0.8 2.1 1.3
1.5 2.3 0.7
1.5 0.9 2.4
1.8 2.3 3.6
0.5 1.1 2.1
1.2 1.5 1.8


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